We perform an empirical investigation of the macroeconomic consequences of international terrorism and interactions with alternative forms of collective violence. Our analysis is based on a rich unbalanced panel data set with annual observations on 177 countries from 1968 to 2000, which brings together information from the Penn World Table dataset, the ITERATE dataset for terrorist events, and datasets of external and internal conflict. We explore these data with cross-sectional and panel growth regression analysis and a structural VAR model. We find that, on average, the incidence of terrorism may have an economically significant negative effect on growth, albeit one that is considerably smaller and less persistent than that associated with either external wars or internal conflict. As well, terrorism is associated with a redirection of economic activity away from investment spending and towards government spending. However, our investigation also suggests important differences both regarding the incidence and the economic consequences of terrorism among different sets of countries. In OECD economies, in particular, terrorist incidents are considerably more frequent than in other nations, but the negative influence of these incidents on growth is smaller.
Introduction
There has been a long tradition in economics for researchers to try and understand the economic consequences of conflict and peace. In the aftermath of World War I and leading up to the origins of World War II, Keynes (1919) , Pigou (1940) , Meade (1940) and Robbins (1942) sought to trace through the interactions between the international political situation of their day with the economic one, and applied economic reasoning to offer pertinent policy advice. More recently, researchers have also taken great strides to understand these interactions between conflict and economic well being. Garfinkel (1990) , Grossman (1991) , Skaperdas (1992) , Orphanides (1995, 2001a,b) , and Alesina and Spolaore (1997) have extended our understanding in the direction of arming, insurrection, appropriation, diversionary conflict, form of governance, and the number and size of nations.
In comparison to external wars and internal conflict, terrorism-and, in particular, its economic consequences-has received much less attention in the economics literature. But our attention has changed in the post September 11 th era. The heightened awareness of the human cost associated with terrorist events as well as the significant redirection of economic resources, presumably motivated by the perceived risks associated with possible future terrorist incidents, have refocused efforts towards a better understanding of the economic consequences of terrorism.
Political scientists have long emphasized that terrorism has been a constant source of worldwide tension through much of the post World War II era, and indeed the very origin of the term points to a long history, dating back to the late 1700s. 1 In her seminar contribution on the causes of terrorism, Crenshaw (1981) , identifies modernization, 'social facilitation' and the spread of revolutionary ideologies as important factors that drive terrorism. This political theory serves as a useful point of departure for empirical investigations of terrorism. Modernization can isolate certain groups while at the same time provide more cost effective ways of equipping these same groups. This view of modernization suggests that terrorism may be more prevalent in higher income countries (i.e OECD countries) which tend to experience higher rates of technological progress. 2 Social facilitation or 'social habits and historical traditions that sanction the use of violence against the government' (p.382) is another way of saying that internal violence begets violence. This points to the importance of controlling for interactions between terrorism and other forms of conflict in order to identify the economic consequences of the former, a consideration we incorporate into our analysis. Crenshaw's final factor comes in such a variety in the data (e.g. nationalism, religion, etc.) that its exploration from an economic perspective is beyond the scope of this paper.
A few economic researchers have also examined theoretical aspects of the incidence of terrorism. Sandler (1988,1993) present game theoretic analyses of terrorism, wherein they analyze terrorism as a signaling game in the face of incomplete information as well pre-commitment by the government to not negotiate with terrorist. More recently, Garfinkel (2003) has analyzed the interactions between terrorism and other types of conflict. Using a simple dynamic general equilibrium model, she demonstrates that all types of conflict have potentially large complementarities with terrorism.
On the empirical side, Enders, Sandler and Cauley (1990) and Enders and Sandler (1993) have developed a model to assess the effectiveness of terrorist-thwarting policies on reducing the incidence of terrorism. Unfortunately, they find little evidence for legislative activity in preventing terrorism. O'Brien (1996) looks at whether terrorism is used as a foreign policy tool by international superpowers: he argues that authoritarian regimes are more likely to sponsor terrorist attacks following setbacks in the foreign policy arena. Finally, work by Enders, Sandler and Parise (1992) examine the impact of terrorism on the economy. They find that there are large and substantial losses to the tourism industry caused by terrorist incidents. More recently, Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana (2003) examine the impact of terrorism on recessions.
The economic literature has therefore reinforced the political science literature by stressing terrorism's important link to institutions and other forms of conflict. It also has stressed that these factors have strong economic consequences as well. The purpose of our paper is to examine the macroeconomic consequences of terrorism with these issues in mind. We first document the pervasive nature of international terrorism since 1968, and juxtapose its frequency and impact on economic activity in comparison to internal conflict and external conflict. Then, we investigate the dynamic interactions between these alternative forms of collective conflict and their consequences on economic growth based on cross country growth regressions, panel data regressions, and Structural VARs. We find that, on average, the incidence of terrorism may have an economically significant negative effect on growth, albeit one that is considerably smaller and less persistent than that associated with either external wars or internal conflict. As well, terrorism is found to redirect economic activity away from investment spending and towards government spending. However, our investigation also suggests important differences both regarding the incidence and the economic consequences of terrorism among different sets of countries. Terrorist incidents appear considerably more frequent in more developed nations than in other nations. On the other hand, the negative influence of terrorist incidents on growth appears most significant in the developing world.
The Data and Empirical Regularities
In this section, we describe our data sources and limitations and examine some basic empirical regularities of the resulting dataset. In constructing the data set, our goal is to benchmark terrorism data with the standardized and broadly accepted international economic data source-the Penn World Table data, based on the work by Summers and Heston (1991) . 3 This has certain implications for the organization of our data. Importantly, since our benchmark is given as a country-year panel, we must convert data on the incidence of terrorism (and other variables) accordingly. To allow for examination of possible strategic complementarities and substitutability across forms of collective violence, we include other standard measures of conflict including: internal measures such as genocide, ethnic war, revolutions and irregular regime changes; and external measures that allow for both home and away wars. Addition of these variables also permits us to examine some measurement issues associated with the possible mis-classification of various forms of conflict. Our intent is to examine the interaction between terrorism and the economy, controlling for the possible bias associated with inadvertently coding other forms of conflict as terrorism and possible interactions between these types of conflict. We discuss this issue again in section 3.
Our data set are obtained from four different individual sources. To measure terrorist activities, we employ the latest update of the "International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events" (ITERATE) data set from Mickolus et. al. (2003) . The economic data are obtained from a recent update of the Summers and Heston (1991) (Penn World Table) data set. The internal conflict data are obtained from Gurr et al (2003) and the external conflict data are obtained from the most recent update to Brecher, Wilkenfeld and Moser (1988) . In all, the resulting data covers 177 countries over 33 years providing an unbalanced panel data set of over 4000 observations. Of these sources, the Penn World Table dataset has been examined extensively in the economic literature, and we consequently devote little attention to describing it. More attention is given to describing our other sources than are much less common in the economic literature.
The ITERATE data set attempts to standardize and quantify characteristics, activities and impacts of transnational terrorist groups. The raw data is grouped into four broad categories. First, there are incident characteristics which code the timing of each event. Second, the terrorist characteristics yield information about the number, makeup and groups involved in the incidents. Third, victim characteristics describe analogous information on the victims involved in the attacks. Finally, life and property losses attempt to quantify the damage of the attack.
In order to be considered an international/transnational terrorist event, the definition in ITERATE is as follows: "the use, or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing, extra-normal violence for political purposes by any individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established governmental authority, when such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than the immediate victims and when, through the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its location, the nature of its institutional or human victims, or the mechanics of its resolution, its ramifications transcend national boundaries."
In short, a terrorist event is required to be employed for political purposes to influence a wider target group on an international scale. This means that events such as September 11, 2001 are included in this dataset but some other terrorism events, such as the Oklahoma city bombing, are not deemed to meet all the relevant criteria and are not included in the ITERATE dataset and are thus necessarily also excluded in our analysis. 4 ITERATE provides a rich micro-level data set of 12,164 incidents of terrorism across 179 countries from 1968 to 2001. Unfortunately, the information across many of the subcategories mentioned above is not provided in a consistent manner as the original source material comes from news organization resources which may fail to report a particular factor, such as the number of victims. This presents a significant limitation of this dataset. Because of this limitation, we limit our attention to the number of terrorist incidents reported, which is the most consistent measure reported in the ITERATE dataset. Indeed, since we cannot control for the significance of individual events, for our baseline measure of terrorism incidence we define a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if a terrorist event is recorded for a given country year and 0 otherwise. 5 To be sure, this definition is less than perfect. However, it also ensures that the incidence of terrorism will be measured in a manner comparable to the incidence of other forms of conflict in the data set which have also been conventionally reported as dummy variables. Before we examine the basic properties of the terrorism data, we first provide an abridged description of the other data resources.
External war, a trigger to a foreign policy crisis, is defined by Brecher, Wilkenfeld and Moser (1988) as:
"a specific act, event or situational change which leads decision-makers to perceive a threat to basic values, time pressure for response and heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities. A trigger may be initiated by: an adversary state; a non-state actor; or a group of states (military alliance). It may be an environmental change; or it may be internally generated."
A foreign policy crisis with an intensity of a specified magnitude is called a conflict This particular definition comes from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project undertaken by Brecher, Wilkenfeld, and Moser (1988) which includes the initiation or escalation of a conflict that warrants the highest level of severity.
The Internal war data, obtained from Gurr et al (2003) , provides data that originates from four broader categories. First, ethnic conflict is defined as conflict between the government and national ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities seeking changes in their status. In order to be considered a war, more than 1000 individuals had to be mobilized and 100 fatalities must have occurred. Second, genocide is defined to include the execution, and/or consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal group (genocide) or a politicized non-communal group (politicide). The numbers of those killed are not as important as the percentage of each group. This differs from ethnic conflict in that victims counted are non-combatants. Third, revolutionary conflict is defined as conflict between the government and politically organized groups seeking to overthrow those in power. Groups include political parties, labor organizations, or parts of the regime itself. Once again, in order to be considered a conflict, more than 1000 individuals had to be mobilized and 100 fatalities must have occurred. An example of such a war would be the Chinese Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989. Finally, regime change includes state collapse and shifts from democratic and authoritarian rule as defined by a shift of at least 3 points on the Freedom House polity scale. 6 This measure does not include nonviolent transitions.
As there may be some unintended overlap between the data coding and actual incidence of internal conflict and terrorism, we will include both in our empirical investigation to see if they behave in a different manner. On a cursory level, there is little evidence that the internal conflict data is merely an overlap of terrorism. The pair-wise correlation coefficient is actually quite small 5 We did employ other measures to gauge the economic effects of terrorism such as the sum or average number of terrorist events for a country-year pair. However, the general qualitative results were similar to those reported below for these alternative measures of terrorism.
6 Freedom House measures the extent of democratization of a regime using two measures-civil liberties and political rights. Both measures are scaled 1 to 7 with 1 being the most democratic.
at about 0.06 once controlling for country effects which gives us some comfort when considering measurement issues. As well, there could be strategic complementarities and/or substitutabilities among these types of conflict, which could either increase or lessen the effects of terrorism on economic activity.
The economic data comes from the Summers and Heston data set. We calculated log percapita annual growth rates of the data, investment as a percent of GDP, etc. for countries in our data set from 1968 to 2000. The main advantage of employing the Summers and Heston data set is that it is calculated in PPP adjusted exchange rates so that cross-country comparisons can be made with better adjustments due to price differences.
The Geography of Terrorist Incidents
Let us return to a basic overview of the terrorism data. 7 This is usefully summarized by a map of the world (Figure 1) . Each country has a graduated color with the darkest representing the countries with the most terrorist events and the lightest representing the countries with the least. The areas of the world that appear to be those with the most terrorism are the Americas and Europe whereas there appears to be far less terrorism in Africa.
This might cause one to conclude that terrorism is an unfortunate consequence of wealth and freedom. For example, after Lebanon at 25.5 terrorist events per year, the United States experiences the second highest terrorist incidence, with an average of about 20.4 terrorist events a year, followed closely by Germany and France at 19.3 and 17.9 respectively. However, neighboring countries with similar income and political systems do not suffer from terrorism. Countries such as Canada at 1.4 incidents per year and the Nordic countries such as Sweden (1.6) Norway(0.5) and Finland (0.0) do not have such problems. More to the point, from 1995 to 2000, as incomes increased across the globe, and democratization increased to unprecedented levels, the average number of terrorist events per country year actually fell and remained below the long term average of about 2.0 in each year. 8
To understand the incidence of terrorism activity in a more concrete fashion, consider the following fact from two of the high-terrorist countries mentioned above-the United States and France. During the 1960s, 1970s and part of the 1980s, the main perpetrator in each country came from a single organization. In the United States, the FALN (Armed Front for National Liberation) which is a Puerto Rican separatist group, was the main culprit and in France the main instigator was (CNLF) the Corsican National Liberation Front. Yet, in both cases, during the later part of the 1980s and 1990s, both FALN and CNLF are virtually non-existent. Such anecdotal evidence is suggestive of many issues facing researchers dealing with these data which may complicate interpretation of the results. Some statistics may be unduly influenced by one interest group, region or country and may be quite hard to generalize going forward. 9
Moreover, if we considered the prevalence of terrorism on a per capita basis, the relationship between governance, income and terrorism is slightly smaller. While a simple Spearman rank correlation shows that the correlation between the country rankings of average incidence of terrorism and the country rankings of average terrorism per capita is 0.60, countries with large populations such as the United States drop in world rankings. Indeed, as one might suspect, countries in the Middle East tend to be countries with higher rates of terrorist incidents per capita. 10
The Empirical Regularities of Terrorism Versus Other Types of Conflict
This subsection provides a snapshot of terrorism (that is, the incidence of terrorism) around the world to understand its importance and examine its relationship to other forms of conflict. On the surface level, terrorism seems to resemble possibly less economically significant incidents of internal war. Terrorism is similar to internal war in its frequency-the incidence of both is considerably higher than that of external conflict. However, terrorism appears to be positively correlated with income, while internal and external conflict are negatively correlated. A closer look reveals that much of this relationship, however, is due to country fixed effects.
Table 1 presents the basic statistics on internal conflict (I), external wars (E) [both home (H) and away (A)], and terrorism (T).
We have parsed the data in a variety of ways to highlight any differences across the various measures of conflict. Table 1 begins with the basic statistics to include mean (MEAN), standard deviation (STD), measures of first-order autoregressive persistence (AR1), and the sum of squares (SSQ). Finally, to highlight the possible time or country bias mentioned in the previous subsection, we provide a breakdown of the variation brought by each of the individual (INDIV), time (TIME) and random (RANDOM) effects. Each column provides the results from a different parsing. Column 2 provides the results over the entire sample. Column 3 provides the results for non-democracies (NONDEMO). Column 4 provides results for OECD economies, which we consider our sample of high income countries. Columns 5 through 7 provide results for Africa (AFRICA), the Middle East (MIDEAST) and Asia (ASIA).
The top panel is for internal conflict. This variable occurs in about 1 out of every 7 countryyears and is much more likely to occur in non-democracies and low income regions. It is twice as likely to occur in the Middle East as in Africa, the latter of which makes up the majority of countries in our sample. One interpretation that is consistent with these results is that many non-democratic and/or low-income countries are inundated with internal strife and this may explain the lion's share of why certain countries fail to advance. Interestingly, when considering the variance decomposition of the data, the individual effect seems to be as important as the random effect, with very little variation from the time effect. This implies that we must consider controlling for country fixed effects in the next section to ensure that these few strategic regions influence are not dominating the data.
Moving to panels two and three, we see something much different in the external war data. First, external wars are a much less frequent event as even the sum of home and away wars occur at a rate of one tenth the size of internal conflict. Second, while there continues to be a "Middle East" effect in external wars, the decomposition of the variation is almost entirely driven by the random component which suggests that controlling for individual effects will be less important for external war data. Third, home and away wars behave in a much different manner. Indeed, for OECD economies, there are no recorded Home wars in our data sample.
Finally, we turn our attention to the incidence of terrorism. As reported in our dataset, terrorism occurs more frequently than other forms of conflict. On average, the frequency is twice that of internal conflict. Its occurrence in Africa and the Middle East is practically identical to internal conflict, highlighting its close relationship. This is also born out in the variance decomposition. A significant portion of the variance in the data is driven by individual effects, once again suggesting the importance of both understanding and controlling for individual effects in the following empirical portion of the paper.
Interestingly enough, terrorism incidents are reported more frequently in democracies and high income (i.e. OECD) countries. This is exactly opposite to what was found in the other forms of conflict. This suggests that terrorism and internal conflict are fundamentally different and provides some assurance that the terrorism data do not primarily capture internal conflict episodes, which would have implied a severe identification issue for our analysis. This point is best seen when examining Table 2 . Table 2 provides further evidence on the relationship between terrorism and other data. Terrorism is indeed correlated with internal conflict-though the relationship is almost entirely seen through country fixed effects. Table 2 also shows that there is a strong positive correlation between terrorism and income-though once again entirely demonstrated through country fixed effects.
Following Table 1, Table 2 parses the data across different samples to examine the correlation of terrorism and other forms of conflict with and without fixed effects. 11 In addition, this table examines the correlation of terrorism and economic variables such as GDP per capita (y), growth (∆y), exports+imports/GDP (OPEN), and Gini coefficient (GINI). 12
The first panel of Table 2 , shows that terrorism is not highly correlated with either home or away wars but is significantly positively correlated with internal conflict. It is also striking to see that the correlation coefficient between income and terrorism is significantly positive at about 0.20. This strong positive relationship might at first glance seem counterintuitive. The unexpected relationship may in fact have more to do with an alternative third factor that cannot be controlled for in such simple analysis as correlations. There is some support for this conjecture when we examine the correlation in democracies (0.06) and for high income countries (-0.03), which demonstrates that for higher income countries which are often democracies, the correlation disappears. We pursue this line of reasoning in section 3.
Upon further inspection, the strong positive relationship between terrorism and internal conflict and terrorism and income is driven by a few sub-samples. In particular, the correlation between terrorism and internal conflict is twice as high in Africa than in other regions. Furthermore, the correlation between terrorism and income is three times higher in the Middle East than other regions. All of these results when taken together provide support for reconsidering these same correlations without time and country effects. The second panel is devoted to this exercise.
Panel two shows that removing these effects significantly decreases the correlation between terrorism and conflict, even though terrorism continues to be more correlated with internal conflict (0.06) than home (-.001) and away (0.02) wars. This panel also shows that removing these effects causes the correlation between terrorism and income and growth to turn negative. In fact, the correlation between income and terrorism turns from positive to negative and statistically significant for democracies. Panel three further highlights these points by comparing the correlation the same variables with only country effects included. The correlations between all measures of conflict are all positive and statistically significant. The correlations between income and terrorism are similarly high.
To summarize, there appears to be a strong and positive relationship between terrorism and internal conflict and terrorism and income or growth. It also appears that much of this relationship is driven by country fixed effects-a key element we will control for below for the following reasons. In the following section we attempt to sort out these long run and short run effects of terrorism on the economy as well as to understand some of the short run feedback between terrorism and other types of organized conflict.
The Empirical Results
The purpose of this section is fourfold. First, we want to extend our analysis to examine the economic impact of terrorism within the context of the long-standing cross national growth regression literature. Second, given our concerns about the possible bias associated with over-representation of specific time and year effects, we wish to re-examine these results when controlling for these effects in panel regressions and control for possible endogeneity bias using instrumental variables estimation. Third, we wish to establish the extent to which conflict and terrorism reallocate economic activity across investment and government spending. Finally, using these basic findings, we construct a Structural VAR to examine the impact of terrorism on GDP per capita and the interrelationship between terrorism and other forms of violence. 13 The results from this section lend support to the findings reported earlier. We find that the incidence of terrorism in a country in a given year is associated with a reduction in per capita growth by less than one tenth of a percentage point, an impact similar to that associated with the incidence of internal conflict. And, while the impact of terrorism on growth is larger once controlling for time and fixed effects, the impact is smaller than either that of internal or external conflict. In addition, we provide evidence that terrorism is associated with a reallocation of income away from private investment spending and towards government spending. Finally, there is an important complementarity between internal conflict and terrorism. We interpret this to mean that terrorism behaves like internal conflict but is not as economically significant, consistent with the results in the previous sections.
Cross Country Growth Regressions
We begin these exercises by constructing our baseline model by appealing to the literature on economic growth. The workhorse model employed in the literature is cross country regressions (see e.g. Barro, 1997) subjected to robustness checks (see e.g. Levine and Renelt, 1992) . As is well documented, the majority of variables in such cross-sectional growth regressions are not found to be as statistically or economically significant as standard growth theory might suggest.
More recently, a slew of papers has sought to attack this difficulty by introducing a better set of instruments for geography, policy or institutions with some promising results. For example, Frankel and Romer (1999) use a gravity model as an instrument for trade to demonstrate the importance of policy in growth. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) use historical data on settler mortality to demonstrate the importance of institutions in growth. However, Dollar and Kraay (2003) have recently documented that such instruments may be weak in the sense that the results based on IV/GMM methods are not robust once including other relevant information. With this in mind in our analysis we report both results based on standard growth regressions using OLS as well as estimates based on an IV/GMM approach.
Our baseline model includes investment as a share of GDP (I/Y) and the log of initial GDP (lny0) to control for transitional dynamics. We also include a dummy for Africa (AFRICA) which researchers have consistently identified as important, both in economic and statistical terms. Starting from this baseline model, and in line with earlier work in this literature, we examined other policy, regional, or institutional variables that might be important in explaining economic growth. Our findings were broadly consistent with the early research-most institutional, geographical or policy variables tended to be fragile in their ability to statistically influence economic growth. Hence, we only include one more control variable (COM)-a dummy variable for non-oil commodity exporters-found to be robust in other research [Easterly and Kraay (2001) ] when using data that includes many small countries, such as our own. 14
For the IV/GMM counterparts to our baseline models, we followed the suggestion in De La Croix and Doepke (2003) and controlled for the possible endogeneity bias by employing initial values of the transitional variables as instruments. Table 3 reports the results from the purely cross-sectional regressions. Column 1 is the base 14 We found the trade measure COM was more often statistically significant than either ln(openness) or a dummy variable for oil. The negative coefficient associated with com may indicate that the variable is a proxy for countries that are susceptible to trade shocks but do not have the revenue associated with oil. This is consistent with what was found in Easterly and Kraay (2001) .
case following the early 1990s growth literature. Columns 2 and 3 sequentially include terrorism (T) and internal conflict (I). Column 4 and 5 include external conflict separate and then together with other forms of conflict to demonstrate how the different types of conflict influence growth. Columns 6 through 10 repeat the same regressions with one change-IV/GMM is employed to instrument for the endogeneity of investment.
Column 1 yields the standard results for growth-investment has a positive impact and initial income, Africa and commodity exporters have a negative impact-each statistically significant at all conventional levels. In fact, the sign of these effects are all quite similar to what others have shown using different techniques and data samples. The only impact that appears to be slightly different is the coefficient on initial GDP, which is smaller primarily because we employ GDP in 1967 and not 1960 which is typically used. 15
Column 2 provides our first direct estimate on the impact of terrorism. The impact is negative and statistically significant, implying that if a country were to experience a terrorist event in each year in the sample, per capita growth would drop by about 1.5 percent. To estimate the impact of one conflict for a given year, we must divide the coefficient by 33. While the impact may seem small, it is actually slightly higher than the impact of internal conflict on growth which is given in Column 3.
Column 4 provides more evidence on conflict's impact on growth. In this case, we see that external conflict appears to have a large and negative impact. Yet, we see that the impact of external war is not statistically significant even when considered with other forms of conflict.
It is possible that these effects appear small because of endogeneity bias. To address this issue, columns 6 through 10 show the impacts on growth using the IV/GMM specification. We see the general results carry through suggesting the presence of a robust, though economically small, impact of both terrorism and internal wars on growth. More reassuring is the fact that formal tests of the exogeneity of our instruments demonstrate that the model is not rejected at the 0.05 level. However, while the magnitude of the coefficients are higher on the conflict variables, the magnitude is actually smaller on I/Y implying our instruments may not be as strong as one would like. 16 There are several possible interpretations of the strong statistical (though small in an economic sense) impact of terrorism in Table 3 . First, since the data in Table 3 is purely cross-sectional, there may be important fixed effects that are dominating the information in the data. One way to control for this is to include dummies such as COM and AFRICA, but this is crude at best. Moreover, given our findings in Tables 1 and 2 , it might be surprising that the coefficient on terrorism and growth or consumption is negative, given the strong positive correlation in the fixed effect terms.
Second, since the data is cross-sectional, the regression may be capturing only the long run effect of terrorism on growth or consumption. It may be of greater interest to examine separately the short-and long-run impact of terrorism given that much of the concern about the economics 15 The results are not sensitive to this measure. We employ the data in year 1967 as it is the year before the terrorism data is available. 16 We repeated the same exercise using consumption growth as the dependent variable instead of economic growth. The rationale for this regression is that standard economic theory suggests that utility is a function of consumption, not output. The results (not shown) for consumption growth are very similar to those presented for output.
of terrorism may be related to its impact on financial markets which may have a more transitory relationship to growth.
Finally, we may estimate a small economic impact because the impact is in fact small. The main point here is that although results based on cross-sectional regression, such as presented in Table 3 , are suggestive, there are significant challenges in interpreting them. Since we are unable to differentiate between long and short run and fixed effects bias, we turn our attention to panel regressions and later also examine the data from the viewpoint of a Structural VAR.
In Table 4 , we reexamine the evidence presented in Table 3 in terms of panel regressions. 17 The main differences are that we control for time and fixed effects in the regressions; we are able to examine other sub-samples (NONDEMO, OECD, AFRICA, MIDEAST, ASIA) because we have sufficient observations; and we include one more statistically significant covariate-log of openness (lnop)-as it appears to be highly statistically significant and of the expected theoretical sign, namely: 18
Column 1 once again shows that I/Y and lagged GDP per capita are statistically significant and have the theoretically predicted sign. 19 Openness, lnop, is also statistically significant and positively signed-consistent with theory. In columns 1 through 4 we are able to estimate the impact of different types of conflict on growth, controlling for time and fixed effects. We find that the coefficient on terrorism continues to be negative and statistically significant. Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficient is much larger than in the cross-section implying a terrorist attack reduces growth by about 0.5 percent in a given year. Analogously, internal conflict and external conflict also have much higher impacts than in the cross-sectional case. In fact, they each have a much larger impact on growth than does terrorism.
Columns 5 through 10 provide the results for other sub-samples-OECD, AFRICA, ASIA, MIDEAST and NONDEMO countries. The results are broadly consistent for the Africa, Asia and non-democratic columns. However, the impact of terrorism is only statistically significant in Africa. 20 The results from the cross-national regressions tell a consistent story. Terrorism appears to have a statistically strong (though economically smaller) negative impact on growth. This remains true even when considering other types of conflict and endogeneity concerns. Panel regressions which attempt to control for the potential bias due to country or time, do reveal a stronger negative impact of terrorism on growth. Yet, terrorism's drag on growth is one third or even one sixth of internal conflict or war. In short, the result remains strong-terrorism appears to have a small, 17 We only present the results for growth for space considerations. We also ran the regressions for consumption growth with practically identical results. These results are available from the authors upon request.
18 As in the earlier case, we considered various institutional and policy variables with little statistical impact and do not show them here. As well, using instruments for investment and openness provided broadly similar results.
19 The qualitative results are not sensitive to the lag structure of the control variables. 20 Though not shown, the results are remarkably similar if consumption growth is employed as the dependent variable. All forms of conflict have a negative impact on consumption growth, with terrorism providing the smallest loss of the three. though significant, negative impact on growth.
Compositional Effects
The important finding from the results reported above is that economic activity appears to be impaired by conflict. The economic mechanisms which generate the slowdown in economic activity are, however, difficult to untangle using aggregate macroeconomic data. From a theoretical standpoint, though, there are a number of possible candidates for why conflict may have an impact on economic activity. First, conflict and terrorism can have an immediately negative effect on output to the extent that it destroys production inputs. Second, conflict and terrorism can severely interrupt economic activity by disrupting household and business spending plans, which can also quickly translate into reduced output. Third, conflict and terrorism may lead to a reallocation of economic activity within a country away from more productive types of spending to spending that is intended to improve the nation's security.
Unfortunately, given the relatively poor quality of cross country data, we cannot sort through these hypotheses beyond acknowledging that they may all have harmful effects on economic activity-as we have established in Tables 3 and 4 . We can, however, examine the extent to which a country's investment rate (I/Y )-that is the ratio of investment to GDP-and government spending rate (G/Y )-that is the ratio of government spending to GDP-are affected by conflict and terrorism. A decline in the investment rate and a rise in the government spending rate would be consistent with conflict and terrorism leading to a reallocation of resources away from the accumulation of productive inputs through reduced investment spending, towards increased spending on security (and presumably less productive government activities). We present results from this examination in Table 5 . The models employed in the table are very similar to those in equation (2), except that we place the investment and government spending rates as the dependent variables, and remove the investment rate as an explanatory variable.
The results in Table 5 provide some interesting information that is consistent with our earlier findings. First, the data indicate that terrorism has a strong and negative impact of about half of a percentage point on the investment to GDP ratio. Indeed, as the results in columns 1 to 4 indicate, terrorism has a negative and statistically significant effect on the investment ratio, though the other types of conflict do not. This suggests that even though terrorism has been shown to have the smallest effect on GDP growth, investment spending tends to adjust more negatively to terrorism than do other spending components of GDP. The results in columns 5 through 8, replace the investment share of GDP as the dependent variable with the government spending share of GDP. The results indicate that both terrorism and internal conflict tend to make the government spending rate rise in relation to overall economic activity, with the effect of internal conflict being approximately twice as large as that for terrorism. Notice in particular, that for terrorism the rise in the government spending ratio, approximately 0.4 percentage points, tends to offset the decline in the investment spending ratio, approximately -0.4 percentage points. Taken together, the results indicate that while overall economic activity falls in the face of terrorism, government spending seems to get crowded in while investment spending tends to get crowded out, though the effect is modest. 21
A Structural VAR Model
While the results in the earlier sections analyzed the impact of conflict on growth and the reallocation of economic activity, there is a sense in which some of these influences may be confounded or mis-attributed due to the dynamic interactions between types of conflict. Indeed, given the interactions between types of conflict documented in Tables 1 and 2 , parsing out the separate effects of internal conflict from terrorism on economic activity may be particularly challenging. Moreover, given the likely possibility that alternative forms of organized conflict may be strategic complements are substitutes for one another, a fuller accounting for the effects of terrorism on economic activity.
Our approach is to analyze the issues within a Structural vector autoregression (VAR). The benefits from this are that while we do not have direct restrictions to impose from a theoretical model, we do have a plausible identifying structure that we can test using over-identifying restrictions.
Consider the following four variable VAR that includes, in order, the log-level of real GDP per-capita, as well as dummy variables for internal conflict, external conflict and terrorism. 22, 23 Such a VAR allows for economic activity to affect the probability of conflict, for economic activity to feedback onto conflict and it also allows for each type of conflict to dynamically interact with other types of conflict. The lag length for the VAR estimates is set at two and, as explained above, we also include fixed effects and time effects in the VAR. 24 We label the reduced form innovations, e Yt , e Tt , e Et , e It from the VAR where the residual are from the output, terrorism, external conflict and internal conflict equations, respectively. It is straightforward to show that this four variable VAR can identify 6 off-diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix, and that by estimating fewer than 6 elements we can test the system's over-identifying restrictions. As such, the estimation scheme will also provide a mapping from the reduced from errors, e, to the structural innovations, .
Our approach to identification is two-fold. First, based on economic intuition, broad historical evidence, and the evidence presented above, conflict can clearly have an effect on economic activity within period. We incorporate this into our model through equation (3) which states that output responds to shocks in the other endogenous variables within a year.
The second identification restriction is that internal conflict is a driving force for other types of 22 The VAR also includes lagged investment and openness as exogenous right hand side variables. They are included to provide continuity with our panel regressions presented above. The VAR results are not affected by the exclusion of these variables from the analysis. 23 The VAR results are robust to allowing for separately considering home and away external conflicts. We consider them together only to keep the analysis more parsimonious. 24 The results are robust to changing the lag length.
conflict, as seen in equations (4) and (5) where terrorism and external conflict respond to shocks from internal conflict. Finally, equation (6) indicates that internal conflict is the most exogenous variable in the system that depends only on itself within period.
The justifications for our identification restriction are three-fold: First, there is a statistical basis for the selection. Since, we have no strong priors on an identification strategy, our approach was to examine the broadest possible set that were eligible (see Table 6 ). From this set, the above model not only seemed quite plausible but more importantly was the model for which the overidentifying restrictions were not rejected. Second, political theory suggests that internal conflict impacts terrorism. As first described in Crenshaw (1981) , terrorism may be determined by internal conflict. Third, internal conflict is quickly becoming one of the primary culprits named in the escalation of violence today. Of the 25 conflicts listed by Stockholm International Peace Institute in 2000, all but 2 were internally motivated. And policy-makers have been quick to respond. The World Bank has recently developed a research group called "The Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit" to examine such issues with resources devoted from a "Post-Conflict Fund." 25 Table 6 provides the estimates of the four variable Structural VAR described in expressions (3)−(6). Each column provides the estimated coefficients a 1 −a 5 , and standard errors for a different sample: the full sample, non-democracies, OECD, Africa, the Middle East and Asia, respectively. As well, the bottom part of the table provides the p-values from a number of tests of over-identifying restrictions: p-value 1 is the p-value from the test of the restrictions embodied in equations (3) to (6). 26 The remaining p-values are for alternative specifications that allow for all shocks to conflict to have a contemporaneous effect on output, but varying combination of interactions between the conflict variables. 27
There are three main findings presented in the Table 6 consistent with our earlier results. First, each form of conflict harms growth with terrorism providing the least economically significant impact. As indicated by the estimated coefficients for α 1 − α 3 the estimate contemporaneous effect of terrorism, external conflict and internal conflict on output is approximately −0.5, −4.3 and −1.3 percentage points, respectively. Second, there are strong complementarities between the various forms of conflict. As indicated by the estimated coefficients for α 4 and α 5 , shocks to internal and external conflict lead to a significant increased probability of terrorism. This indicates that internal conflict tends to crowd in other types of conflict, including terrorism. Finally, as indicated by the p-value 1, the over-identifying restriction cannot be rejected at or below the 0.1 level of statistical significance. In sum, these findings indicate that our earlier findings are robust to allowing for dynamic effects of conflict on output as well for dynamic interactions among the conflict variables. 26 This p-value is derived from a χ 2 test with 1 degree of freedom. 27 More specifically, p-value 2 is the p-value from a structural VAR model where α4 = α5 = 0 so that internal conflict does not have a contemporaneous effect on terrorism and external conflict. P-value's 3 (4) are from structural VAR's where conflict has a contemporaneous effect on output but only terrorism (external) conflict has a contemporaneous effect on internal and external (terrorism and internal) conflict. P-value 5 is from a structural VAR where conflict has a contemporaneous effect on output but only external and internal conflict has a contemporaneous effect on terrorism. P-value 6 is a restricted version of the model in equations (3) − (6) where a5 = 0: in other words, only innovations to internal conflict have a contemporaneous effect on innovations to terrorism. There is one degree of freedom for p-value tests 3 through 5, and two degrees of freedom for p-value tests 2 and 6.
Structural VAR. The figure is arranged so that each column demonstrates the dynamic response of the row variables to a one standard deviation shock to the variable denoted at the top of the column. For example, starting from the upper most left corner, we depict a one standard deviation shock to output on output, terrorism, external conflict and internal conflict, respectively. Columns 2 through 4 continue the exercise with the shocks from terrorism, external and internal conflict, respectively. Along with the dynamic response, the 90 percent confidence interval is also plotted. These bands are computed using the technique pioneered by Sims and Zha (1999) .
The impulse responses in Figure 2 demonstrate a number of key findings. First, the direct negative impact from external and internal shocks to GDP is much larger and longer-lived than from terrorism. So, while the effect of terrorism on economic activity is contemporaneously negative and significant, its effects quickly dissipate even after one year. In contrast, the effect of external war are significant and negative for up to 3 years, while internal conflict has a negative, significant and worsening effect on output for the first few years, which continues to be significant after 6 years. Second, there are strong contemporaneous complementarities between internal conflict and terrorism but there is no feedback with external conflict. This may mean that terrorism and internal conflict provide triggers to one another providing an additional indirect influence on growth. Figure  2 shows that not only do innovations to internal conflict tend to drive up terrorism, but innovations to terrorism itself drives up internal conflict. However, shocks to external conflict do not appear to drive up other types of conflict; rather, they appear to significantly lessen the likelihood of internal conflict in the short run. 28
The sub-sample estimates of the Structural VAR in Table 6 provide a number of additional findings regarding the significance of non-democratic and developing countries. 29 First, the contemporaneous impact of terrorism on output is significant only for non-democracies and Africa. In particular, the effect for Africa is extremely large. Africa is dramatically affected economically by terrorism and internal conflict, and internal conflict has a particularly strong and synergistic effect on external conflict and terrorism. This suggests that efforts directed towards quelling internal conflict may be especially valuable in Africa as a means towards improving prospects for economic growth. Second, for OECD economies, internal shocks have a much larger impact and negative contemporaneous affect on output, than does terrorism. Moreover, shocks to internal conflict tend to lessen external conflict in OECD economies, rather than increase them as in the full sample. Finally, the over-identifying restriction for the Structural VAR, p-value 1, is not rejected at or below the 10 percent level for any of the sub-samples providing strong support for our identification strategy. 30 This provides indirect evidence consistent with the theory originally put forth in Crenshaw (1981) .
Conclusion
Using a unique data set that provides information on the incidence of international terrorism around the world over four decades, we have endeavored to examine some basic facts regarding the consequences of terrorism on economic activity. We have found that on average, the incidence of terrorism may have an economically significant negative effect on growth, albeit one that is considerably smaller and less persistent than that associated with either external wars or internal conflict. Further, the incidence of terrorism appears to be associated with a diversion of spending from investment towards government expenditures. We also identify differences across geographic areas and political governance both regarding the incidence as well as the likely consequences of terrorism. For advanced economies, as captured by our OECD sample, the evidence of a negative association between the incidence of terrorism and economic growth appears to be smaller and is not statistically significant. These first results, however, should be interpreted with caution. In particular, the relatively poor quality of data regarding individual terrorism incidents forces us to concentrate on measures of the incidence of terrorism that may be much more noisy than our data on the incidence of other forms of conflict, complicating comparisons. Further, to the extent the nature of terrorism has evolved in ways we cannot detect with our data, we may not be able to rely on the historical evidence with much confidence as a guide of the consequences of terrorism in the future. Nonetheless, our results suggest that the macroeconomic consequences of terrorism are potentially quite significant, confirming the need for a redoubling of public policy efforts towards examining how to best mitigate the associated risk. Notes: Robust standard errors are presented in square brackets. * , * * and * * * represent statistical significance at the .01, .05 and .10 levels, respectively. Models (1) through (10) are different specifications of cross country growth regressions. Models (1) through (5) are the basic OLS model adding separately the different forms of conflict, i.e. terrorism (T), internal conflict (I), home (H) and away (A) wars and their sum, external wars (W). Models (6) through (10) repeat the exercises but estimate the model as IV/GMM with initial investment as a percent of GDP (I/Y) as the instrument. Included in each regression is a dummy for non-oil exporting commodity countries (com), Africa (afr), initial GDP per capita (lny0) and average investment as a percent of GDP (I/Y). The R-squared measure does not include excludes the contribution from the individual fixed effects. The e's are the reduced form residuals for output, terrorism, external conflict and internal conflict, and are the structural shocks. P-value 1 is the p-value from the χ 2 (1) test of the restrictions embodied in equations (3) to (6). P-value 2 is the p-value from a χ 2 (3) test of the structural VAR model where α 4 = α 5 = 0. P-value 3 (4) is from a χ 2 (1) test of a structural VAR's where conflict has a contemporaneous effect on output but only terrorism (external) conflict has a contemporaneous effect on internal and external (terrorism and internal) conflict. P-value 5 is a χ 2 (1) test from a structural VAR where conflict has a contemporaneous effect on output but only external and internal conflict has a contemporaneous effect on terrorism. P-value 6 is the χ 2 (2) test from is a restricted version of the structural VAR model where a 5 = 0. 
